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IntroductIon
On March 5, 2012, the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights 
sent a letter to Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Chairman Julius Gena-
chowski regarding diversity in media ownership.1 It was signed by representatives 
of several prominent human rights organizations, including the American Civil Lib-
erties Union (ACLU) and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP).2 This letter explained that “[t]he civil rights community has long 
regarded the expansion of minority and female ownership in media as an important 
goal because of the powerful role the media plays in the democratic process, as well 
as in shaping perceptions about who we are as individuals and as a nation.”3
In short, the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights was ex-
pressing its concern over worrisome statistics that indicate a fundamental inequity in 
the distribution of mainstream media’s power dynamics. The letter claimed that de-
spite the fact that Latinos, African Americans, Asian Americans, and Native Ameri-
cans combine to constitute a full third of the American population, these minority 
groups only represent 4.6% of the ownership of all television stations4 and 7.24% 
    
    *       Indiana University Maurer School of Law, 2014. Notes and Comments Editor for the 
Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality. Special thanks to Professor Michael McGregor for 
lending his expertise and assistance in the research for this Note.
     1.  ACLU, Ctr. For Cmty. Change, Common Cause, Cmmc’n Workers of Am., Leader-
ship Conference on Civil & Human Rights, BNAACP, Nat’l Orgs. for Women Found, United 
Church of Christ & Office of Commc’n, Inc., to Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Robert Mc-
Dowell, Comm’r & Mignon Clyburn, Comm’r, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n (Mar. 5, 2012), avail-
able at http://www.civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/mediatel/fcc-final-signatories-3-5-12.pdf.
     2.  Id.
     3.  Id. at 1.
     4.  Id. at 3 (citing S. derek turner, Free PreSS, oFF the dIal: Female and mInorIty 
radIo StatIon ownerShIP In the unIted StateS 4 (2007), http://www.freepress.net/files/off_
of the ownership of all radio stations.5 In a similar vein, women comprise approxi-
mately 51% of the country’s population; nevertheless, females own just 5.87% of 
commercial television stations6 and 6% of commercial broadcast radio stations in 
the United States.7
These statistics led many, from human rights watchdogs to media policy-
makers, to note with some dismay the modest efforts made by the FCC to encour-
age meaningful change in this arena.8 While the FCC once boasted a relatively 
robust slate of incentives and systematic advantages for minority and single-station 
owners, these policies and programs are now largely defunct.9 Combined with on-
going reduction in the limitations upon station ownership and the corresponding 
rise in media consolidation, many onlookers believe that there is an inevitable trend 
toward the demise of viewpoint diversity.10 To illustrate the prevalence of media 
consolidation into the hands of fewer, larger companies, consider that from 1984 to 
2004, the overall number of radio station owners has fallen over 34%.11 The clear 
trend is that a few large ownership groups are acquiring more and more media 
properties.
Part I of this Note will focus on the history of deregulation in the United 
States and the apparent effects of past reductions in efforts to increase ownership 
diversity. This Part will examine the general loosening of the legal limitations upon 
the concentration of media among individual owners. Part II will focus on the rise 
and fall of the FCC’s affirmative action programs that specifically sought to increase 
the market share enjoyed by both minorities and females. Part III will consider 
empirical data that demonstrates the inequity of the current ownership landscape. 
Finally, this Note will seek to demonstrate the need for the reestablishment of 
the_dial.pdf).
     5.  Id. (citing Catherine J. K. Sandoval, Minority Commercial Radio Ownership in 2009: 
FCC Licensing and Consolidation Policies, Entry Windows, and the Nexus Between Owner-
ship, Diversity and Service in the Public Interest 5 (2009), http://centerformediajustice.org/
wp-content/files/Minority_Commercial_Radio_Broadcasters_Sandoval_MMTC_2009_final_.
pdf).
     6.  Id. at 2 (citing S. derek turner & mark cooPer, Free PreSS, out oF the PIcture 
2007: mInorIty & Female tV StatIon ownerShIP In the unIted StateS: current StatuS, 
comParatIVe StatIStIcal analySIS & the eFFectS oF Fcc PolIcy and medIa conSolIdatIon 2 
(2007), http://www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/fp-legacy/otp2007.pdf).
     7.  Id. (citing turner, supra note 4, at 4).
     8.  See, e.g., Peter Siegelman & Joel Waldfogel, Race and Radio: Preference Externali-
ties, Minority Ownership, and the Provision of Programming to Minorities, in 10 adVanceS In 
aPPlIed mIcroeconomIcS 73 (Michael R. Baye & Jon P. Nelson eds., 2001), available at http://
transition.fcc.gov/ownership/roundtable_docs/waldfogel-c.pdf; Leonard M. Baynes, Making 
the Case for a Compelling Governmental Interest and Re-Establishing FCC Affirmative Action 
Programs for Broadcast Licensing, 57 rutgerS l. reV. 235, 237 (2004).
     9.  See Baynes, supra note 8.
     10.  See Siegelman & Waldfogel, supra note 8.
     11.  Baynes, supra note 8, at 239.
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affirmative action programs and the viability of such programs under the strict scru-
tiny standard.
I. the hIStory oF deregulatIon
 
 No legislative act has done more to shape the current environment in broad-
casting than the 1996 Telecommunications Act. Prior to 1996, the FCC closely 
regulated national consolidation of media properties.12 In other words, strict limits 
precluded monolithic corporations from accumulating the concentration of owner-
ship required to substantially affect viewpoint diversity. The rationale for these re-
strictions was relatively straightforward: for broadcasting to serve the public inter-
est, it was important to preserve the ability for many speakers to shape the content 
available to the public.13 Diverse programming would create fuel for discourse and 
reduce the chance of any entity exerting undue influence upon the national con-
sciousness.14
 The 1996 Telecommunications Act slackened this restriction significantly. 
In addition to raising a previously existing restriction on the percentage of the na-
tional audience that a single television property owner could potentially reach,15 the 
Act also wholly abolished the restriction on the total number of television stations 
or radio stations one entity could own.16 This set off a feeding frenzy as powerful 
multiple-property owners snapped up smaller properties in an attempt to solidify 
their power bases. As an example of just how pronounced this effect was, Clear 
Channel Communications amassed ownership of over 1,200 radio stations between 
the passing of the Act in 1996 and 2003.17
 In many ways, the 1996 Telecommunications Act was a logical outgrowth 
of previous deregulatory acts. For instance, during the early days of the FCC, 
the ownership cap for television stations for a single owner was three stations 
nationwide.18 In 1944, this cap was lifted to five stations.19 By 1985, the cap had 
     12.  See Telecommunications Act of 1996, FCC, http://transition.fcc.gov/telecom.html 
(Dec. 13, 2013).
     13.  See, e.g., FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 780 (1978) (“The 
Commission has long acted on the theory that diversification of mass media ownership serves 
the public interest by promoting diversity of program and service viewpoints, as well as by 
preventing undue concentration of economic power.”).
     14.  Id.
     15.  The cap on the total percentage of the potential national audience a single television 
owner could reach was raised from 25% to 35%. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-104, §§ 202(a), 202(c)(1)(B), 110 Stat. 56.
     16.  Id. at § 202(a), 202(c)(1)(A).
     17.  erIc klInenberg, FIghtIng For aIr: the battle to control amerIca’S medIa 62 
(2007).
     18.  Jonathan W. Emord, First Amendment Invalidity of FCC Ownership, 38 cath u. l. 
reV. 401, 413 (1989).
     19.  Id.
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been further raised to twelve.20 Clearly, the move toward a deregulated climate of 
media ownership has been a gradual progression.
Radio station ownership rules were relaxed even further, as national reach 
limits were not introduced for radio. Instead, the only remaining restriction on the 
ownership of radio properties is the local consolidation rule, which creates a sliding 
scale for the ownership of commercial radio stations based on the size of the media 
market.21 For instance, while a single media property owner can own up to eight 
combined commercial and non-commercial radio stations in a city with forty-five 
or more stations, a single owner can own no more than six stations in a market with 
only fifteen to twenty-nine stations.22
 An additional requirement of the 1996 Telecommunications Act has also 
had a far-reaching impact: the imposition of a mandate upon the FCC to conduct 
a biennial review (later modified by Congress to a quadrennial review) of its poli-
cies.23 Congress required that the FCC “shall determine whether any of such rules 
are necessary in the public interest as the result of competition. The Commission 
shall repeal or modify any regulation it determines to be no longer in the public 
interest.”24 In essence, this section imposes an ongoing requirement upon the FCC 
to remove non-essential regulations, which seems likely to drive future deregula-
tory efforts. This effect is obvious in Fox Television v. FCC, a 2002 case in which 
the D.C. Circuit Court rejected the FCC’s attempts to justify the National Televi-
sion Station Ownership Rule because the FCC needed to observe the effects of the 
newly raised national ownership cap before taking further action.25 The court found 
that “[t]he Commission’s wait-and-see approach cannot be squared with its statu-
tory mandate . . . to ‘repeal or modify’ any rule that is not ‘necessary in the public 
interest.’”26 Thus, the rule has been read to require action as soon as the regulation 
appears to have outlasted its usefulness.
 The first indication of the significance of the biennial review requirement 
came following the 2002 review. The FCC reviewed the entirety of its broadcast 
ownership policies and ultimately issued the 2003 Media Ownership Order.27 This 
order, which examined restrictions on everything from national television owner-
ship to local radio ownership to the cross-ownership rules that precluded one entity 
     20.  roger l. Sadler, electronIc medIa law 105 (2005)
     21.  Review of the Broadcast Ownership Rules, FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/guides/review-
broadcast-ownership-rules (Dec. 13, 2013).
     22.  Id.
     23.  Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56, 112, 
amended by Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629(3), 118 Stat. 
100.
     24.  Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56, 112.
     25.  Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC (Fox I), 280 F.3d 1027, 1041−42 (D.C. Cir.), 
modified on reh’g, 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
     26.  Id. at 1042.
     27.  Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd. 13620 (2003).
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from operating multiple types of media outlets within a single local market,28 has 
become the focal point of an ongoing judicial battle. After the Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals struck down many of the 2003 order’s provisions in the Prometheus I 
case,29 the FCC issued its 2008 Remand Order.30 While the 2008 Order reset most 
policies to their pre-2003 levels, the case again returned to the Third Circuit in Pro-
metheus II in 2011.31 While Prometheus II focused on the cross-ownership rules for 
newspapers and broadcast stations and is beyond the scope of this Note’s focus, the 
ongoing judicial dialogue is illustrative of the continuing controversy surrounding 
these issues.
 The 2003 Media Ownership Order also once again raised the national tele-
vision ownership rule limit on the portion of the potential market that an individual 
media property owner could reach from 35% to 45%.32 In so doing, the FCC con-
cluded that the national television cap was not necessary to promote viewpoint di-
versity, but instead served the primary function of preserving localism in program-
ming.33 In 2004, Congress imposed a statutory cap of 39%, which superseded the 
FCC’s proposed 45%.34 
This section of the Ownership Order also went to great lengths to demon-
strate that the priorities of a local station are more closely aligned with the needs 
and tastes of an individual community and thus are better able to serve the pub-
lic interest of a local market. This outcome was driven in part by the finding that 
independently owned stations were more likely than network owned stations to 
resist programming initiatives by networks. The FCC found that by protesting or 
preempting certain programming decisions that affiliates did not feel would serve 
its community’s public interest (and thus the affiliates’ own economic interest) net-
work programming was better tailored to fit local needs.
A final contribution of the 2003 Media Ownership Order is the diversity in-
dex.35 This controversial tool, designed to replace traditional cross-ownership limi-
tations, attempts to assign numerical values to signify the concentration of a given 
media market. The equation factors in the number of media outlets (defined as 
     28.  Id. at 13623.
     29.  Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC (Prometheus I), 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004).
     30.  Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules, 23 FCC Rcd. 2010 (2007), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC (Prometheus II), 652 
F.3d 431, 472 (3d Cir. 2011).
     31.  Prometheus II, 652 F.3d 431.
     32.  2003 Media Ownership Order, 18 FCC Rcd. at 13814–15.
     33.  Id. at 13815.
     34.  Christopher S. Yoo, Architectural Censorship and the FCC, 78 S. cal. l. reV. 669, 
705 (2005). According to Yoo, setting the national television ownership cap at 39% allowed 
Congress to avoid a showdown with Fox and Viacom, who had exceeded the previous 35% cap 
using temporary waivers granted by the FCC. Id. at 705 n.171. Setting the cap at 39% allowed 
Congress to defuse political momentum in favor of further liberalization. Id.
     35.  2003 Media Ownership Order, 18 FCC Rcd. at 13814−15.
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television stations, radio stations, newspapers, and internet service providers) and 
the number of discrete property owners operating within the market.36 The relative 
impact of each of these types of media is scaled using intermedia weightings to ad-
just for the perceived importance of diversity within that medium; for instance, the 
intermedia weighting for television is 33.8%, while the weighting for the internet is 
a mere 12.5%.37 Thus, a concentration of power with one owner is viewed as more 
problematic for television than a similar amount of concentration for an internet 
service provider. This index would provide a rule of thumb for calculating the likely 
impact of proposed mergers on the diversity of a given market.
The diversity index was considered in Prometheus I.38 While the Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals found that the implementation of the diversity index was not 
constitutionally untenable, it found that the FCC had failed to properly support 
its analysis.39 The decision focused on the lack of reasoned analysis regarding the 
choice and weight of the media outlets incorporated into the index.40 The decision 
went on to say that even if the diversity index was considered to be an accurate 
portrayal of media concentration, the proposed merger rules based upon the index 
were inconsistent and were not “rationally derive[d] . . . from the Diversity Index 
results.”41 For these reasons, the diversity index was struck down.42
II. the rISe and Fall oF the Fcc’S aFFIrmatIVe actIon PolIcIeS
The FCC is not, and has never been, blind to the impact of minority and 
female ownership on the end product received by consumers.43 In 1998, the FCC 
adopted the following position regarding the impact of minority and female station 
ownership:
We do not assume that minority and female employment will always 
result in minority and female-oriented programming. Nor do we 
believe that all minorities or all women share the same viewpoints. 
Nonetheless, we believe that, as more minorities and women are 
employed in the broadcast industry, it is more likely that varying 
perspectives will be aired and that programming will be oriented to 
     36.  Id. at 13783.
     37.  Id.
     38.  Prometheus I, 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004).
     39.  Id. at 404–06.
     40.  Id. at 406−09.
     41.  Id. at 409.
     42.  Id. at 411.
     43.  See, e.g., Laurie Mason, Christine M. Bachen & Stephanie L. Craft, Support for FCC 
Minority Ownership Policy: How Broadcast Station Owner Race or Ethnicity Affects News and 
Public Affairs Programming Diversity, 6 Comm. L. & Pol’y 37, 39 (2001).
235
   Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality                                 Volume 2, Issue 1
serve more diverse interests and needs.44
While this stance expressly stops short of acknowledging an inherent link 
between station ownership and content production, it was the FCC’s open admis-
sion that there is, at minimum, an imperfect correlation between the two.45 Ad-
ditionally, a 2001 study by Siegelman and Waldfogel, which was adopted by the 
FCC, lent support to the hypothesis that policies promoting minority and female 
ownership will in fact result in an increase in the amount of content produced that 
is targeted for consumption within those demographics.46
Despite early reluctance to expressly consider race and ethnicity in the ad-
judication of license applications due to the lack of an empirically proven nexus 
between station ownership and content, the FCC was prodded into action by a 1973 
decision of the D.C. Court of Appeals in the TV 9 case, which found that “minority 
ownership is likely to increase diversity of content” and that programs providing an 
advantage to racial and ethnic minorities were integral to the FCC’s responsibility 
to promote the public interest.47
     44. Review of the Commission’s Broadcast and Cable Equal Employment Opportunity 
Rules and Policies and Termination of the EEO Streamlining Proceeding, 65 Fed. Reg. 11315 
(Jan. 20, 2000), available at http://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Mass_Media/Notices/1998/
fcc98305.txt..
     45. See, id.
     46. See Siegelman & Waldfogel, supra note 8. The study’s abstract provides as follows: 
Market provision of radio programming is beset by possible inefficient 
underprovision of formats appealing to small audiences whose social 
benefit of programming—but not advertising revenue—exceeds their 
costs. Larger markets have more programming, so that listeners derive 
benefits from being in the same market as others with similar preferenc-
es, a mechanism we term “preference externalities.” Yet, because white 
and minority content preferences are substantially different, preferences 
externalities are positive only within group. We expect problems of inef-
ficient underprovision to be more likely for small minority populations. 
We find evidence that policies promoting minority ownership increase 
the amount of minority-targeted programming.
Id. at abstract.
     47. TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The court further elaborated: 
To say that the Communications Act, like the Constitution, is color blind, 
does not fully describe the breadth of the public interest criterion embod-
ied in the Act. Color blindness in the protection of the rights of individu-
als under the laws does not foreclose consideration of stock ownership 
by members of a Black minority where the Commission is comparing the 
qualifications of applicants for broadcasting rights in the Orlando com-
munity. The thrust of the public interest opens to the Commission a wise 
discretion to consider factors which do not find expression in constitu-
tional law.
Id. at 936. As justification for this stance, the court quoted its earlier decision from Citizens 
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In response, the FCC adopted a number of affirmative action programs for 
the purpose of promoting minority ownership and active management.48 The fol-
lowing four programs were adopted for this purpose, though each has subsequently 
fallen out of favor or been explicitly repealed.
A. Racial Minority Preferences in Comparative Hearings
During the days when it was common practice for the FCC to resolve multi-
ple claims to a particular station via comparative hearings, the FCC frequently used 
both race and gender as factors in assessing the relative merits of the candidates.49 
In fact, the FCC had an express list of criteria that it considered in deciding between 
multiple claimants to a particular broadcast property.50
First, the commission considered “two primary objectives,”51 including 
which station could offer the “best practicable service to the public, and . . . a 
maximum diffusion of control of the media of mass communications.”52 Then, the 
panel would review secondary factors including diversification of control of the 
media, whether the station owner participated full time in the station’s function, 
the proposed programming or content of the station, past broadcast record, efficient 
spectrum use, and the “character” of each applicant.53
The FCC adopted the 1978 Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership 
of Broadcasting Facilities, which created a preference for minority ownership.54 
However, the D.C. Circuit Court found in Bechtel v. FCC that the underlying 
definition used for the comparative criterion of “integration of ownership and 
Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1213 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1971), which read in 
part, “As new interest groups and hitherto silent minorities emerge in our society, they should 
be given some stake in and chance to broadcast on our radio and television frequencies.” TV 9, 
Inc., 495 F.2d at 937.
     48. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 588 (1990) (“The FCC noted that 
‘[w]hile the broadcasting industry has on the whole responded positively to its ascertainment 
obligations and has made significant strides in its employment practices, we are compelled to 
observe that the views of racial minorities continue to be inadequately represented in the broad-
cast media.’” (citation omitted)).
     49.  See Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 
F.C.C.2d 979, 979–80 (1978).
     50.  Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 393 (1965).
     51.  Id. at 394.
     52.  Id.
     53.  Id. at 399.
     54.  Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d 
at 981–83 (justifying the reinforcement of this preference by saying, “[h]ence, the present lack 
of minority representation in the ownership of broadcast properties is a concern to us. We be-
lieve that diversification in the areas of programming and ownership—legitimate public inter-
est objectives of this Commission—can be more fully developed through our encouragement 
of minority ownership of broadcast properties.”).
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management” was arbitrary and capricious.55 Thereafter, the FCC stopped imple-
menting the enhancement as a criterion for comparative hearings.
It is unlikely that this program will ever be resurrected. In 1997, Congress 
ordered that the FCC conduct its selection of license holders in competitive markets 
based on an auction method.56 This measure means that the comparative hearings 
in which race and gender could have been used as a factor in assessing applicants’ 
merit are no longer a valid process that the FCC can choose to employ.
B. Racial Minority Preferences in Lottery Selections
In a similar vein, the FCC used to weight the odds in lottery selections for 
station allocation to grant a more favorable chance of winning to minority owners.57 
This program was primarily used when awarding licenses for low-power television 
stations. However, once Congress mandated that station allocation be controlled by 
an auction system, this initiative became obsolete.
C. Tax Certificate Program
Another program designed to foster minority media ownership was the tax 
certificate policy. The FCC adopted this program in 1978 as part of greater efforts 
to meet its obligation to ensure diversity in media ownership. This policy allowed 
media property owners to sell off media properties to qualifying minority buyers 
while either deferring or altogether avoiding the subsequent capital gains tax on 
the transactions.58 This made such sales very attractive and effectively subsidized 
minority media owners with benefits unavailable to larger conglomerates.
The policy was in effect until 1995 when Congress repealed it. The program 
was repealed due to concerns that it was being abused by deals either structured so 
that the sale was to a “minority owner” who was not actively involved in the man-
agement of the station or by using a minority as a middle man to ensure a tax break 
for the seller; sales executed under either of these conditions obviously failed to 
accomplish the program’s underlying objective of placing minority owners in posi-
tions to influence content.59 Because Congress repealed this measure, the FCC does 
not possess the authority to reinstate this program without congressional assistance.
     55.  10 F.3d 875, 877 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
     56.  See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312, 
388 (1993).
     57.  See Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 
F.C.C.2d at 984 n.22.
     58.  See Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 
F.C.C.2d at 982–83.
     59.  See generally Bruce R. Wilde, Note, FCC Tax Certificates for Minority Ownership of 
Broadcast Facilities: A Critical Re-Examination of Policy, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 979 (1990), for a 
fairly comprehensive outline of the types of abuse with which Congress was concerned.
238
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D. Distress Sales
 
 Minorities also received preference in distress sales, which occurred when 
a station either lost its accreditations or went bankrupt.60 Under this program, mi-
nority station owners were often able to obtain ownership of a struggling station’s 
license for no more than 75% of the station’s actual fair market value.61 This created 
considerable incentive for minorities to take on more media ownership responsi-
bilities, while having a sizable portion of the required capital outlay essentially 
subsidized by the FCC. Unfortunately, the FCC last attempted to implement this 
policy in 1995 due to concerns about whether the program would survive height-
ened constitutional scrutiny.62
E. Constitutional Disposition
 
 The rise and fall of the FCC’s affirmative action programs was shaped in 
part by the changing national discourse on race-related programs as a whole. As 
described above, the FCC received a mandate from the D.C. Court of Appeals re-
quiring the creation of programs for the benefit of minority broadcast owners.63 
The propriety of these programs was upheld in the 1990 Supreme Court case of 
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC.64 The Supreme Court determined that the racial 
diversity in broadcasting promoted by the FCC’s programs promoted the type of 
“important” government interest that could survive intermediate scrutiny, the then-
existing standard for affirmative action programs.65
 However, Metro Broadcasting was reversed just five years later by Ada-
rand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.66 This case raised the constitutional bar to one of 
strict scrutiny, which requires a compelling government interest and a program 
narrowly tailored to promote that interest.67 The FCC harbored serious concerns as 
     60. See Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d 
at 982–83.
     61. Alan G. Stavitsky, The Rise and Fall of the Distress Sale, 36 J. broadcaStIng & elec-
tronIc medIa 249, 249 (1992).
     62. See id. at 255–56.
     63. TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929, 936 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
     64. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
     65. See id. at 548. As the Court described:
Benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress—even if those 
measures are not “remedial” in the sense of being designed to compensate 
victims of past governmental or societal discrimination—are constitution-
ally permissible to the extent that they serve important governmental ob-
jectives within the power of Congress and are substantially related to the 
achievement of those objectives.
Id.
     66.  515 U.S. 200 (1995).
     67.  See, e.g., id. at 202.
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to whether its programs could surmount either of these hurdles. First, despite the 
affirmation under Metro Broadcasting that broadcasting diversity was an “impor-
tant” government interest, it was unclear whether courts would find that the type of 
diversity these programs sought to promote constitutes a compelling interest.
The second, possibly more daunting hurdle, was whether race-based af-
firmative action was narrowly tailored to address the issue of diversity in media 
content. While Metro Broadcasting expressly accepted the FCC’s contention of 
the existence of a nexus between minority ownership and program diversity,68 it 
was unclear whether courts would continue to uphold this rationale under the more 
demanding strict scrutiny test. While further empirical studies have demonstrated 
that there is a correlation between program diversity and minority ownership,69 the 
concept of being “narrowly tailored” leaves enough to judicial discretion that it is 
difficult to say whether courts would uphold such programs if they were proffered 
for examination.
F. Currently Existing Programs
 
 Currently, the FCC has no formal affirmative action programs designed for 
the explicit benefit of minority station owners. Instead, the FCC has implemented 
only a very limited range of policies designed to benefit small businesses or busi-
nesses owning few or no other media properties.
 The current state of the FCC’s policies on race and ethnicity is encapsulated 
in the Diversity Order,70 which was released alongside the 2008 Order issued in the 
aftermath of Prometheus I.71 The first prong of the Diversity Order formally adopted 
     68.  The court declined to challenge the FCC’s determination in this matter, stating that 
“[t]he FCC’s conclusion that there is an empirical nexus between minority ownership and 
broadcast diversity is a product of its expertise, and we accord its judgment deference.” Metro 
Broad. Inc., 497 U.S. at 570.
     69.  Jeff Dubin & Matthew L. Spitzer, Testing Minority Preferences in Broadcasting, 68 S. 
cal. l. reV. 841, 869 (1995), which states that: 
[W]e have seen that minority ownership has a distinct and significant im-
pact on minority programming, even after we control for the composition 
of minorities in the marketplace. . . . The magnitude of the coefficients for 
black ownership on black programming and Hispanic ownership on Span-
ish programming are significantly larger than the coefficient for female 
ownership on female programming. We also see, however, that a greater 
degree of female ownership leads to increases in programming targeted to 
several other minority groups. Stations with female ownership are more 
likely to program primarily for females, but are also more likely to in-
crease programming for blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and American Indians.
     70.  Promoting Diversification of Ownership in the Broadcasting Services, 23 FCC Rcd. 
5922 (2007).
     71.  Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules, 23 FCC Rcd. 2010 (2007), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC (Prometheus II), 652 
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antidiscrimination rules banning such practices as discriminating on the basis of 
race or gender, both in station sale and in advertising contracts.72 The second prong 
pledged to undertake more comprehensive studies on the demographics of its own-
ers as part of the biennial Form 323 ownership report.73 
 The third prong of the Diversity Order expanded opportunities for “eligible 
entities” under existing FCC rules. This included a reaffirmation of the distress sale 
policy described above (with the change of eligibility from “minority controlled 
entities” to “eligible entities”), as well as extended construction windows, priorities 
in forming duopolies within a local market, and other advantages.74 Perhaps most 
significantly, eligible entities receive bidding credits in the auction system used to 
assign disputed licenses, giving these entities a distinct advantage over conglomer-
ates controlling a far larger number of properties.75
 The problem with this seemingly promising development lies in the defini-
tion of “eligible entity.” Instead of basing eligibility on owner race, gender, or some 
other character strongly associated with diversity, the term is instead defined strict-
ly as a function of the economic size of the entity.76 This definition, while helpful 
for sidestepping the need to survive review under strict scrutiny, has caused former 
FCC Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein to remark that “[t]he definition of the enti-
ties eligible is so broad . . . that minority- and women-owned businesses are likely 
to be incidental beneficiaries at best.”77 Efforts to review this policy are underway 
and will be described in more detail below.
 In addition to concerns about the efficacy of defining “eligible entities” in 
strictly economic terms, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Prometheus 
II expressly held that the definition provided by the Diversity Order was arbi-
trary and capricious on three grounds.78 First, the Diversity Order did not explain 
how adopting its definition of “eligible entity” would further the goal of increas-
ing broadcast ownership by minorities or women.79 Second, the court pointed out 
that the actual impact of the program, even if fully realized, would have a negli-
gible impact at best because the percentage of minority media owners for small 
businesses and for the industry as a whole are within one percentage point of one 
F.3d 431, 472 (3d Cir. 2011).
     72.  Promoting Diversification of Ownership in the Broadcasting Services, 23 FCC Rcd. 
at 5941.
     73.  Id. at 5942, 5945–55.
     74.  Id. at 5937–39.
     75.  Id. at 5936, 5963.
     76.  To be an “eligible entity” a business must be eligible for the “small business” desig-
nation under the Small Business Administration’s standards. Id. at 5925. The current annual 
revenue standards for television broadcasting stations cannot exceed $13 million and radio 
broadcasting stations cannot exceed $6.5 million. Id. at 5926.
     77.  Id. at 5987.
     78.  Prometheus II, 652 F.3d 431, 469–71 (3d Cir. 2011).
     79.  Id. at 470.
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another.80 Finally, the court noted that the analytical process through which the FCC 
derived its new policies was not based on hard data, because the FCC had collected 
no reliable data revealing ownership by minorities or women in either television 
or commercial radio.81 Without statistical backing, and without a well-developed 
rationale as to how or why this definition of eligible entities would be beneficial to 
minorities, the court found that the FCC’s policy was not rationally derived to serve 
the public good.82
III. emPIrIcal reSearch on mInorIty market Share
 
 Having established the correlation between station ownership and view-
point diversity, the next analytical step is to determine whether deregulatory steps 
taken by the FCC and Congress have in fact led to a reduction in minority owner-
ship. In particular, this Note is interested in the impact specifically on Hispanic sta-
tion owners as something of a proof of concept. If a minority group whose presence 
as a proportion of the overall population has risen so dramatically in recent years is 
still struggling to establish sufficient ownership share, then it paints a dire picture 
for other minority groups whose populations are more static.
  On November 14, 2012, the FCC released its Report on Ownership of 
Commercial Broadcast Stations containing detailed data on gender, race, and eth-
nicities of station owners.83 This is the first such report issued by the FCC since the 
revised Form 323; the FCC had long not required this information on its biennial 
Form 323 ownership report.84 The requirement to more reliably report this data 
went into effect in 2009; thus, the newly issued report illustrates changes between 
the 2009 and 2011 annual reports.85 While this two-year period is insufficient for 
demonstrating long-term trends in the data, and does little to illuminate the degree 
of control that may have been accrued by minorities during the peak of the FCC’s 
affirmative action efforts, it nonetheless provides an interesting snapshot of the cur-
rent state of minority media ownership. 
 The raw ownership figures for 2011 illustrate the staggering degree to 
which the industry lacks minority representation. Hispanic owners accounted for 
only 2.9% of all full-power commercial television stations, 4.5% of all commercial 
AM radio stations, and 2.7% of all commercial FM radio stations.86 Only about a 
quarter (26.5%) of full-power commercial television stations boasted even a single 
     80.  Id.
     81.  Id. at 470–71.
     82.  Id.
     83.  2012 Report on Ownership of Commercial Broadcast Stations, 27 FCC Rcd. 13814 
(2012).
     84.  Id. at 13815.
     85.  Id.
     86.  Id. at 13816–17.
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Hispanic stockholder controlling at least 5% of the station’s ownership rights.87
 As stated in the introduction to this Note, minorities88 comprise a full third 
of the American population. However, the 2012 Report on Ownership released by 
the FCC reveals that these minorities combine to control just 5.1% of all full-power 
commercial television stations, 10.7% of all commercial AM radio stations, and 
6.2% of all commercial FM radio stations.89 The numbers are slightly more promis-
ing if low-power television stations are considered, but the figure for that type of 
station remains at just 15.2%, still well below the level at which these minorities 
are found in the general population.90 Under the premise that ownership serves as a 
reasonable proxy for the ability to influence programming decisions, these figures 
throw concerns about minority underrepresentation, and thus, a lack of viewpoint 
diversity, into sharp relief.
 The nonpartisan research group Free Press released a report titled Out of 
the Picture 2007: Minority & Female TV Station Ownership in the United States.91 
While this piece is older than the FCC report, and limits its scope to television own-
ership instead of also considering radio, its findings paint an equally bleak picture. 
According to Free Press, Latinos comprised 15% of the United States population 
in 2007; however, they controlled only seventeen full-power commercial television 
stations, which amounted to a mere 1.25% of the more than one thousand full-
power stations nationwide.92
The Free Press also reported that there has been a significant drop in owner-
ship levels for minorities since the 1996 Telecommunications Act went into effect, 
claiming that 40% of minority controlled stations were converted to either white 
or corporate control between 1998 and 2007.93 The Free Press laid the continuing 
bleakness of this situation squarely at the feet of the deregulatory changes made as 
part of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, claiming that the majority of sales of mi-
nority-owned stations would not have been permitted under the national ownership 
cap or other bars to media consolidation before the Act removed these controls.94
Clearly, this data does not provide an irrefutable causal link between de-
regulatory efforts and this decline in minority station ownership. However, the pic-
ture painted by this massive shortfall is too clear to ignore. Ideally, one would wish 
to see a proportional share of station ownership enjoyed by Latinos; the shortfall 
     87.  Id. at 13818–19.
     88.  The FCC’s 2012 Report on Ownership of Commercial Broadcast Stations incorpo-
rates statistics about both Latinos, who are considered an ethnic minority, as well as racial 
minorities, a category that includes American Indians, Asians, African Americans, Native Ha-
waiians, Pacific Islanders, and biracial individuals. See id. at 13814.
     89.  See id. at 13816–17.
     90.  See id. at 13822.
     91.  turner & cooPer, supra note 6.
     92.  Id. at 2.
     93.  Id. at 3–4.
     94.  Id. at 3.
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observed instead is a cause for concern not only in its own right, but also as an in-
dicator of the impact other minority groups may be enduring. As a larger data set 
becomes available when future Form 323 ownership reports are filed, it will bear 
watching what trends continue to develop.
IV. arguIng For the return oF aFFIrmatIVe actIon
 
 At this point, the FCC still appears to be clinging gamely to the belief that 
the broadcasting arena can police itself in accordance with the will of the free 
market.95 In other words, the FCC has chosen to let consumer demand for diverse 
programming serve as the incentive for stations to produce such programming. 
However, this begs the fundamental question of whether the public’s tastes truly 
serve as a perfect substitute for the FCC’s requirement of serving the “public 
good.” 
 One explanation for the FCC’s reluctance to impose industry regulation 
centered around advancing minority ownership, particularly on racial or ethnic 
grounds, is the necessity that any such regulation pass muster under constitutional 
strict scrutiny.96 While the FCC has never had one of its affirmative action pro-
grams challenged under the strict scrutiny standard, due predominantly to the fact 
that any such programs which could have been challenged under that standard 
were dismantled before strict scrutiny’s full rise to prominence, there does appear 
to be hope that at least some programs the FCC could implement would survive 
the requirement of a compelling government interest. In both Gratz v. Bollinger97 
     95.  As examined by Adam Marcus in his note, Media Diversity And Substitutability: Prob-
lems with the FCC’s Diversity Index, 3 I/S: J. L. & Pol’y 83 (2007):
 FCC regulations can be classified into one of three models: scarcity, 
trusteeship, and market forces. Current media ownership regulations are 
based primarily on the market forces model. There are no regulatory or 
statutory requirements to air news or public affairs programming; previ-
ously it was believed that stations would continue to provide this type of 
programming in response to market forces.
 The market forces approach to broadcast regulation has resulted 
in a decrease in the number of minutes of news programming per hour, 
stations have cut their news staffs or eliminated them entirely, and news 
has been outsourced to wire services. News that is aired has shifted from 
serious investigations and series to entertainment, sports, and consumer-
related items. “On local TV news, fewer and fewer stories feature corre-
spondents, and the range of topics that get full treatment is narrowing even 
more to crime and accidents, weather, traffic and sports.” . . . The FCC’s 
proposed rules will increase consolidation in the broadcasting markets 
without fixing these systemic problems.
Id. at 88 (citation omitted).
      96.  See Baynes, supra note 8, at 237, 249–52.
     97.  539 U.S. 244 (2003).
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and Grutter v. Bollinger,98 the Supreme Court indicated that the merits of diversity 
in education, business, politics, and the military might be so valuable as to rise to 
the compelling interest level.99 If the program could be implemented so as to be 
narrowly tailored to further these interests, it appears to be entirely feasible that 
the FCC could reinstate at least some race-based preferential practices.100
 Perhaps most encouragingly, there are signs that the FCC’s commissioners 
are tired of the inertia that has limited progress on this front. As part of the 2008 
Diversity Order, then-Commissioner Michael Copps expressed his dissatisfaction 
with the ongoing failures of the FCC’s diversity initiatives saying, “Racial and 
ethnic minorities make up 33 percent of our population. They own a scant 3 per-
cent of all full-power commercial TV stations. And that number is plummeting. 
. . . It is almost inconceivable that this shameful state of affairs could be getting 
worse; yet here we are.”101 Hopefully, the discontent with the status quo, com-
bined with the judicial mandate for better standards imposed in the Prometheus II 
decision, manifests itself as a move toward meaningful reform in the near future.
 One avenue for reform that is already being explored is the possibility of 
reconfiguring the “eligible entities” definition for the current system of bidding 
credits. In December 2010, FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski released a public 
notice soliciting comment on redefining the “eligible entities” eligible for bidding 
credits and other systemic advantages.102 Specifically, Commissioner Robert Mc-
Dowell has said that the FCC is considering a new set of criteria that would focus 
on gender and race, although he acknowledges the importance of ensuring that 
such a program would not run afoul of equal protection concerns.103
 Ultimately, there appears to be ample evidence that the FCC’s current 
marketplace ideology has proven to be largely ineffective in fostering the appropri-
ate or desirable level of programming made both for and by minorities and females. 
     98.  539 U.S. 306 (2003).
     99.  See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 268; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330–31.
     100.  See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341.
     101.  Michael Copps, Transcript: Prepared Statement – FCC Meeting, PBS (Dec. 18, 2007), 
http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/12212007/transcript3_fcc.html.
     102. Public Notice, 75 Fed. Reg. 81274 (Dec. 27, 2010), which reads in part:
Under the proposed preference, persons or entities who have over-
come substantial disadvantage would be eligible for a bidding 
credit. The Advisory Committee explains that the new preference 
“would expand the pool of designated entities to include those 
qualified applicants who have overcome substantial disadvantage,” 
noting that the proposed program is analogous in some respects 
to programs used by educational institutions in their admissions 
processes. 
Id. at 81274–75.
     103. Caridad Austin, Note, Overwhelmed by Big Consolidation: Bringing Back Regulation to 
Increase Diversity in Programming that Serves Minority Audiences, 63 Fed. Comm. L.J. 733, 754 
(2011).
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If this trend is allowed to continue, there appears to be a real danger that the per-
centage of stations owned by minorities may continue to decline.
While academics have been careful to note that there is a difference between 
programming that serves the interests of minorities and programming created by 
minority-owned stations, the FCC and much of academia have acknowledged that 
there is at least an imperfect correlation between the two. The FCC must consider 
whether a marketplace model that has led to a demonstrable drop in the ownership 
percentages of minorities truly serves the public interest.
 Encouragingly, however, the commissioners of the FCC asked Congress 
in July of 2012 to reconsider implementing the tax certificate problem. One com-
missioner, Jessica Rosenworcel, told the House Communications and Technology 
Subcommittee that the tax certificate program was “one of the most effective ways 
of promoting diversity of ownership.”104 Another commissioner, Robert McDowell, 
acknowledged that the program in its original form was imperfect, but suggested 
to the subcommittee that it could be tweaked to reduce inefficiency and the chance 
for abuse.105 The reinstatement of a program with a positive track record could lay 
the groundwork for either the reinstatement of other programs that have fallen out 
of favor with the FCC or even new initiatives. However, Congressional endorse-
ment would not be enough, as the hurdle of passing judicial muster under the strict 
scrutiny standard would still have to be cleared. The decisions in Gratz and Grutter, 
coupled with research showing a clear link between station ownership by minori-
ties and programming targeted to those minorities, provide hope that the program 
may survive even under that rigorous standard.
While this one program is unlikely to singlehandedly reverse the trend to-
ward media consolidation, it is heartening to see that the FCC is still exploring op-
tions to ensure the ongoing survival of minority viewpoints. Combined with the ex-
isting programs that provide systemic advantages to small businesses, it is possible 
that the foundation has been laid for a resurgence of affirmative action programs in 
the broadcasting arena.106
Another possibility is the imposition of private regulation within the in-
dustry. Cognizant of the pushback by a vocal subgroup of consumers, large media 
property owners may voluntarily seek to vary their programming or place more mi-
norities in a position to control stations’ content. This sort of private self-regulation 
is consistent with the FCC’s market forces philosophy and would create renewed 
hope in the viability of an industry that could legitimately function under reduced 
federal regulation. Such self-regulation may also dampen many of the doubts ex-
pressed about the demise of the single-station owner. However, such measures may 
     104.  Doug Halonen, FCC Commissioners to Congress: Restore Financial Benefits for 
Sales to Minorities, wraP (July 10, 2012, 3:51 PM), http://www.thewrap.com/media/column-
post/fcc-commissioners-congress-restore-financial-benefits-sales-minorities-47176.
     105.  Id.
     106.  See generally Baynes, supra note 8, at 248–91.
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be insufficient to diffuse the fear that even with apparently diverse programming, 
media ownership groups may use their extensive reach to manipulate the fashion in 
which the public perceives their various properties.
In the short to intermediate term, the trend appears to be toward a continu-
ing reliance on the market forces model. However, the sustainability of this tactic 
appears to be doubtful if the FCC intends to meet its obligation to ensure that di-
verse viewpoints are available as an essential part of the public good.
concluSIon
 
 There can be little doubt that the deregulation of the broadcast industry 
has reduced the viewpoint diversity conveyed to viewers and listeners. While an 
imperfect indicator of this trend, the demise of the minority station owner shows 
just how far this issue has progressed. The dearth of official FCC data makes it dif-
ficult to make compelling empirical conclusions as to long-term changes in station 
ownership trends, but it is indisputable that minorities control a far lower propor-
tion of media properties than their proportional size of the overall population would 
suggest. Additionally, third-party research demonstrates the reduction in minority 
ownership that has transpired since the 1980s.107
The FCC and Congress have been complicit in this reduction, which has 
been exacerbated by both the removal of property ownership regulations and the 
dismantling of programs that affirmatively sought to battle this issue. In order to 
combat this problem, the FCC must accept that its market forces philosophy has 
proven inadequate for the job of protecting the public interest. Carefully construct-
ed affirmative action programs may allow the FCC to pursue diversity in broadcast 
station ownership, as the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the desire for such 
diversity may create a compelling government interest. While the attempt to allow 
consumer behavior to compel the creation of diverse programming was and is a 
commendable goal, the evidence suggesting its failure is simply too formidable to 
continue without substantial modification.
     107.  See turner & cooPer, supra note 6, at 3.
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